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The government will continue to waste billions of dollars sending asylum seekers to the camps on Nauru and Manus Island until we demand humane policies. This might be attributable to the withdrawal of some services and the departure of some people to the US. It is difficult to assess the cost of resettlement. On these figures, offshore detention costs 23 times more per person than resettling a refugee here in Australia.
The money wasted on offshore detention could also go instead towards reversing the deep cuts to welfare, education and health spending that have occurred in recent years. All welcome. This could include airfares for them to travel to Australia, providing accommodation upon arrival, assisting them to find permanent accommodation, and providing information and orientation assistance.
The Government does not pay the travel costs for people who are granted an SHP visa. Traditionally, most of the places available under the SHP are taken up by family members of refugees and humanitarian entrants already in Australia. The following table compares the number of visas granted to refugees resettled from overseas with UNHCR assistance with the number of visas that have been granted under the Humanitarian Program over the last 20 years:.
Successive governments have made ad-hoc announcements that specific groups of refugees are to be resettled to Australia. Often these announcements are in response to mounting public pressure for humanitarian intervention.
In contrast, on 9 September , the Australian Government announced that it would make 12, visas available in response to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. While these places are in addition to the annual Humanitarian Programme intake currently 13, places , they are not technically an increase to the annual Humanitarian Programme.
Rather, these additional 12, places are being offered under a parallel initiative to supplement the annual Humanitarian Programme quota. The number of permanent visas available under the Migration Program for skilled and family migrants has been steadily increasing in recent years to , visas per annum. In contrast, the number of visas available under the Humanitarian Program has been maintained at a relatively steady number between 12, and 13, since The most significant departure from this trend was in — when the former Labor Government, acting on a recommendation of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers, increased the Humanitarian Program to 20, visas with 12, being specifically allocated to the resettlement of overseas refugees.
In making this recommendation, the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers considered that there were a number benefits in increasing the Humanitarian Program:. However, within six months of coming into power in , the current Coalition Government announced that, acting upon an election commitment, it had reduced the number of refugees that would be resettled in —14 from 12, to 7, Over the last few years, there have been consistent calls for the Humanitarian Program to be increased.
From the viewpoint of the host country, it requires willingness for communities to be welcoming and responsive to refugees and for public institutions to meet the needs of a diverse population. It also requires opportunities for refugees to become citizens and to enjoy full and equal participation in society.
For example, Professor Ben Saul from the University of Sydney is of the view that refugees are unlikely to be physically safe in PNG and their basic rights to have access to health care, education, work, social security and an adequate standard of living will not be sufficiently protected.
If such rights were to be guaranteed a different problem would inevitably arise—inequality between refugees and PNG citizens. As the Government of Nauru is only issuing refugees with temporary visas, the Australian Government has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Cambodia to voluntarily settle refugees processed by Nauru in Cambodia.
If these concerns prove to be well-founded and there is little prospect of the refugees voluntarily repatriating to their home countries some of these refugees may end up having to be resettled, presumably with the assistance of the UNHCR. In this context it is relevant to note that in , UNHCR put forward over , refugees for resettlement to participating resettlement countries representing a 28 per cent increase from resulting in close to 82, departures.
Malaysia had the fifth highest number of refugees submitted for resettlement, with over 7, people put forward by the UNHCR.
Australia may arguably end up being the destination country for some of these regionally settled refugees due to the nexus that already exists between them and Australia—as was the case with the majority of refugees processed in Nauru under the Howard Government.
When the Government engaged in regional processing in PNG and Nauru from —, some 1, people subsequently required resettlement. However, the majority— refugees or 61 per cent ended up being resettled in Australia. Similarly, the decision by the former Labor Government to intercept a vessel carrying asylum seekers headed for Australia later transferred to an Australian Customs vessel, the Oceanic Viking and taken to Indonesia , resulted in over 70 refugees requiring resettlement following their refusal to disembark in Indonesia.
Again, a proportion of these refugees ended up being resettled in Australia 22 or 16 per cent. In other words, onshore protection visa grants to refugees who have arrived by boat or plane are deducted from the SHP annual quota 5, in — Rather, the linkage causes a strain on the number of places available to humanitarian entrants under the SHP.
The following table illustrates the reduction in SHP visa grants for humanitarian entrants and immediate family members of resettled refugees over the last ten years which in some years is commensurate with fluctuating onshore permanent protection visa grants. Refugee category visas granted to resettled refugees have remained relatively steady noting a dramatic increase in by the former Labor Government :. It is widely recognised that family reunification is a critical factor in the successful settlement of a refugee in their country of asylum.
Resettled refugees can apply to be reunited with family members in two ways—either through the SHP or through the family stream of the regular Migration Program. In —16 the Government appears to have allocated 5, visas under the SHP to be shared amongst the following groups of people: [54].
This policy shift was considered necessary to amongst other things ease the pressure on the SHP backlog and create an incentive for asylum seekers to seek protection earlier and closer to their country of origin. However, it is not entirely clear whether refugees already in Australia waiting to be reunited with family members abroad will greatly benefit from the additional places made available under the SHP. As mentioned, refugees can also sponsor family members through the family stream of the regular Migration Program, though visa application charges apply and applicants can also experience significant delays in processing times.
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